> What say ye all? Do you think that "True" has any place in the social sciences vs. the observational "I observe this to be useful in this context" or the almost psycho-analytical "I notice that when people believe X together, society does better"?
The problem with that is whoever takes it upon themselves to discard truth and consider 'what will have the best effect on people/society if they were to believe it' —is that you have to manipulate other people into believing it's true on the hope that your assessment of how it's going to affect people is accurate. It's almost certainly not.
It's interesting considering the human brain's criteria for accepting beliefs. It works pragmatically, not with strict adherence to truth—but, from what I can tell (and I've seen some research supporting this), the amount it's willing to deviate from (what it estimates to be) truth is proportional to the immediate demands of present circumstances. If you are in a crisis, it is willing to compromise and adopt a belief that conflicts with evidence, as long as it solves some immediate problem you're facing. But when that happens, you are accumulating something like technical debt. You become sort of 'out of harmony' with your circumstances, and problems will arise given enough time.
Why would it evolve to act in that way? It seems clear the answer is: because it's generally most beneficial to survival to adopt beliefs which best fit the observed data. It's a fair assumption that society holding true beliefs is also going to be most effective for survival.
So when someone manipulates someone else's beliefs because they think it will be beneficial, they are forcing that technical debt on them, and that's a decision only they should make for themselves. The same is true but amplified when considering spreading these ideas to wider audiences.
That said, much of contemporary social science and the humanities are rife with the opposite sort of thinking. This is heavily fueled by the fact that much of it doesn't consider 'correspondent' truth to be a real thing, so in their framework it is meaningless to say they are compromising the truth. Which truth? You can see this in Pragmatism's approach of literally redefining 'truth' to refer to something like 'the most effective belief to adopt'; and even more pervasive are all the schools of thought influenced by a kind of radical relativism which denies the possibility of truth. (It also clarifies a lot of philosophy once you realize the philosophers are actually thinking about the best mind-programs to put into people, rather than seeking truth as a typical person would recognize it. If only the sneaky bastards would say so to their readers' faces. But of course it would not be pragmatic to do so.)
It's a bad idea, and I sincerely hope the fields presently employing it fall into ruin, or are otherwise convinced to abandon it.
I tend to be biased towards wanting to agree with you 1000% on 99% of your post. As I age, though, I become increasingly skeptical of the idea that the human brain is any good at discovering or holding onto the truth. I do believe that the brain can be managed with good mental hygeine and process (https://www.amazon.com/Uncommon-Sense-Heretical-Nature-Scien...), but I find this particular discipline rare in the social science departments I have visited. (I probably just need to get out more).
> It's a fair assumption that society holding true beliefs is also going to be most effective for survival.
This is the part I disagree with. People are social. And their environment is other people. Imagine a nation or tribe populated by Aztecs, or Mormons (No hate - just an example). A person's ability to survive in a territory populated by Aztecs or Mormons is going to be significantly determined by their ability to conform to group beliefs re: normative behavior. The easiest way to do that (thanks mirror neurons!) is to believe it yourself...
> A person's ability to survive in a territory populated by Aztecs or Mormons is going to be significantly determined by their ability to conform to group beliefs re: normative behavior
I agree, but I see that as a separate issue from what I was attempting to address. The specific thing I had in mind was about authority figures in a position to promulgate some new idea to society: is it wise for them to spread ideas known to be false but estimated to have positive effects?
The problem with that is whoever takes it upon themselves to discard truth and consider 'what will have the best effect on people/society if they were to believe it' —is that you have to manipulate other people into believing it's true on the hope that your assessment of how it's going to affect people is accurate. It's almost certainly not.
It's interesting considering the human brain's criteria for accepting beliefs. It works pragmatically, not with strict adherence to truth—but, from what I can tell (and I've seen some research supporting this), the amount it's willing to deviate from (what it estimates to be) truth is proportional to the immediate demands of present circumstances. If you are in a crisis, it is willing to compromise and adopt a belief that conflicts with evidence, as long as it solves some immediate problem you're facing. But when that happens, you are accumulating something like technical debt. You become sort of 'out of harmony' with your circumstances, and problems will arise given enough time.
Why would it evolve to act in that way? It seems clear the answer is: because it's generally most beneficial to survival to adopt beliefs which best fit the observed data. It's a fair assumption that society holding true beliefs is also going to be most effective for survival.
So when someone manipulates someone else's beliefs because they think it will be beneficial, they are forcing that technical debt on them, and that's a decision only they should make for themselves. The same is true but amplified when considering spreading these ideas to wider audiences.
That said, much of contemporary social science and the humanities are rife with the opposite sort of thinking. This is heavily fueled by the fact that much of it doesn't consider 'correspondent' truth to be a real thing, so in their framework it is meaningless to say they are compromising the truth. Which truth? You can see this in Pragmatism's approach of literally redefining 'truth' to refer to something like 'the most effective belief to adopt'; and even more pervasive are all the schools of thought influenced by a kind of radical relativism which denies the possibility of truth. (It also clarifies a lot of philosophy once you realize the philosophers are actually thinking about the best mind-programs to put into people, rather than seeking truth as a typical person would recognize it. If only the sneaky bastards would say so to their readers' faces. But of course it would not be pragmatic to do so.)
It's a bad idea, and I sincerely hope the fields presently employing it fall into ruin, or are otherwise convinced to abandon it.